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I.  PROBLEMS WITH THE CLASSICAL THEORY  
OF LABOUR MARKETS 
The goal of this section is to point out the observed difficulties with the 
classical/neoclassical theory of labour markets. According to classical and 
neoclassical economics, the labour market is a market like any other market. The 
equilibrium wage is determined by the intersection of the supply and demand for 
labour.  
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It is important to note that the labour supply and demand are determined by 
real as opposed to nominal wages. As depicted, the equilibrium wage is real (w/p)* 
and the equilibrium labour supply is L*.  If this classical theory is correct, then it has 
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several important observable consequences. We list some of them, which are 
relevant to our study below: 
 (1) Theory. There is no involuntary unemployment. All unemployment is 
voluntary since those who are unemployed are on the portion of the labour 
supply curve above the equilibrium real wage (w/p)*. This means that 
these people are willing to work only if the real wage is higher than the 
equilibrium wage. In particular, anybody who wishes to work at the going 
wage rate can find a job.  
  Observation. We find many people who are involuntarily unemployed. 
These people want to work at the going wage rate, but cannot find jobs. A 
recent Islamic University ad for Naib-Qasids produced a 1000 applicants 
for 10 positions. All these people were willing to work for the going wage 
rate, but they could not find jobs at that rate. This is in contradiction to the 
supply-demand equilibrium theory of classical/neoclassical economics. 
 (2) Theory. Classical theory offers some possible explanations for the 
observed involuntary unemployment. One is transitional or frictional 
unemployment. People change jobs for various reasons; firms may expand 
or contract due to changes in demand for their products. As people transit 
from one job to another, they may be temporarily unemployed. The 
unemployment we observe is of this kind—people who are temporarily 
unemployed and will soon find jobs (as our theory predicts) in 
equilibrium. 
  Observation. This means that the condition of involuntary unemployment 
is only temporary and should not persist for a long period of time. The 
Great Depression, and many other historical episodes, show that this is not 
true. Large numbers of people want jobs at existing and prevailing real 
wage rates, but cannot do so for long periods of time. 
 (3) Theory. Another possibility, closely related to (2) above, is that we may 
have temporary disequilibrium. The real wage may be higher than the 
equilibrium wage. In this case we see people who wish to work at the 
going wage, but cannot find jobs. Such disequilibrium must be temporary 
according to classical/neoclassical theory. The mechanism which will 
eliminate disequilibrium is the following. Those who are unemployed will 
offer to work for less than the going wage rate. The firm will have every 
incentive to hire new workers at lesser wage, and fire/retire other workers 
who are currently working at a wage above equilibrium. This process will 
lower the real wage until it reaches equilibrium. 
  Observation. This process does not seem to work in practice. Even when 
there were a thousand applicants for the Naib-Qasid job, the university did 
not reduce the prescribed real wage. Nor did the applicants offer to work 
for less. Similarly, there are many historical situations where, despite large 
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and widespread unemployment, the wages of those who are employed are 
not reduced. Workers equivalent in skill to existing workforce and willing 
to work for substantially lower wages are not hired.  
 (4) Theory. Real wages depend only on worker characteristics, and not on 
firm/industry characteristics. There is an aggregate demand for labour (of 
any type) which is the sum of the demand functions over all the firms. 
Similarly, there is an aggregate supply curve. The intersection determines 
the equilibrium wage. A less technical way to make this point is to say that 
all firms compete in the same market. If one firm offers higher wages than 
other firms (for unskilled workers, say) all workers will flock to this firm. 
By the equilibrating mechanism described in (3) above, the excess supply 
of labour available to this firm will drive down the wage until it reaches 
equilibrium. Similarly, if one firm offers less than what other firms are 
offering for unskilled labour, no one will be available to work for the firm 
and the firm will be forced to increase its wages to hire anyone. 
  Observation. There are large and persistent wage differentials across 
industries. Unskilled labourers with equivalent qualifications have 
different wages in hospitals, construction sector, government sector, etc. 
Such differences could arise in temporary disequilibrium, but should get 
eliminated in the long run as wages move towards equilibrium. However, 
the data shows no such tendency for wage differentials to become less 
over time. 
 (5) Theory. A large pool of involuntarily unemployed labourers will exert a 
downward pressure on real wages, but will not have an effect on the 
productivity of firms.  
  Observation. While we find that wages are resistant to change even in 
presence of large pool of unemployed labourers, we find that productivity 
of the firms increase in presence of such a pool. This is in conflict with the 
classical/neoclassical view of labour markets.  
The above observations show that there are several difficulties with the 
classical and neoclassical view of how labour markets work. The efficiency wage 
theory provides an alternative model for labour markets which seems to be more 
compatible with the observations described above. 
 
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR THE EFFICIENCY  
WAGE HYPOTHESIS 
It was the Great Depression which led to the downfall of classical economics. 
The large-scale unemployment which persisted for a long period of time was 
impossible to explain by classical theories. One of the key ideas of the classical 
economists was that the market regulates itself and provides the best possible 
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outcomes without any interference from the government.  It was plain for all to see 
that the Great Depression was not the best possible outcome—the economy had been 
capable of functioning in a much better way, providing more goods and services to 
all of the population. One of the main contributions of Keynes (1936) was to say that 
the market forces did not guarantee full employment. He argued that the labour 
market was peculiar and different from other markets. One could have large scale 
and persistent unemployment. Suitable government policy was needed when the 
effective demand for products was not sufficient to generate full employment. In 
such situations, appropriate government policy would increase demand and lead to 
full employment.  Keynesian views were dominant in economics until the 70s when 
classical theories made a comeback. This was possible mainly because the Great 
Depression had faded from memories of most of the population. Furthermore, 
problems of stagflation created by the oil crisis showed up some weaknesses in 
Keynesian theories.  
The neoclassicals argued that the labour market was just like other markets 
and did reach equilibrium rapidly. It was necessary for them to find an alternative to 
labour market failure to explain the Great Depression. Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963), argued that government mismanagement of the money supply led to the 
Great Depression. Other authors have offered other explanations. See for example 
Bernanke (2004) who argues that the rigid Gold Standard was the main contribution 
factor in the Great Depression. The causes for the Great Depression have been hotly 
disputed and it is not our intent to go into this controversy here. Rather, we will 
focus on arguments developed in support of Keynesian ideas, sometimes labeled 
“new Keynesian” economics. One of the key weaknesses of the Keynesian position 
was the idea that the labour market can stay in disequilibrium for a long period of 
time—it requires government intervention to fix this problem. Why should this be?  
Keynes himself did not provide an explanation. He said that wage bargains were 
conducted in nominal terms rather than real terms, and also that this was not rational, 
but this was how the world worked. The main justification offered for failure of 
equilibrium in labour market was “sticky wages”. Real wages could not be pushed 
downwards.  Observations from the Great Depression and other episodes of long 
term high unemployment provided empirical support for this idea, but there was no 
theoretical explanation of why this should be the case.  
Under pressure from the neoclassical attack in the 70s neo-Keynesians tried to 
defend the idea of sticky wages. They wanted to find an explanation of why the 
labour market fails to function like other markets. One of the main arguments that 
has been developed in this context is the “Efficiency Wage” hypothesis. According 
to this hypothesis, higher wages lead to more efficient performance by the workers. 
If true, this would explain a lot of the observed phenomena discussed in the previous 
section. The classical and neoclassical have a strong ideological commitment to the 
idea the free markets work and provide best possible outcomes for society. 
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Efficiency wages support Keynesian ideas that government interference is required 
to fix problems arising from free markets. Therefore neoclassical have strongly 
resisted the idea of efficiency wages and have attempted to find alternative 
explanations for these phenomena. They have also attacked the idea of efficiency 
wages on many different grounds. Our goal in this paper is to review the evidence 
for and against efficiency wages in the literature, and also especially in the context of 
the labour market in Pakistan.  
 
III.  VARIANTS OF THE EFFICIENCY WAGE HYPOTHESIS 
Before proceeding to examine the evidence, we provide some more detail about 
the efficiency wage hypothesis. Why does paying higher wages increase efficiency?  
There are many possible mechanisms which have been postulated for this purpose. 
Each of these leads to a different variant of the efficiency wage hypothesis.  
 (1) “Nutritional Efficiency”. An early idea due to Leibenstein (1957) is that 
the equilibrium wage is so low that workers cannot feed himself and his 
family properly. In this case he will not have enough energy to work well. 
Giving him a higher wage will allow him to feed himself and will increase 
his output at work.  If correct, this effect would operate only for low wage 
earners—white collar workers and other high wage earners should not be 
subject to this effect. Substantial rise in real wages in the developed 
countries has reduced or eliminated the number of labourers working at or 
near the subsistence level, so this hypothesis is no longer seen in the 
literature.  Efficiency wages are seen at higher wage levels as well, so that 
some other effect must be responsible. Nonetheless, the hypothesis may 
still have some validity in LDC’s where many wage earners earn very low 
wages. Some empirical evidence for this “nutritional effect” may be 
available by looking at sick leaves and/or medical insurance payments for 
low wage earners and comparing them with the same for high wage 
earners.  
 (2) The Adverse Selection Model. This model, due to Weiss (1980), assumes 
that better workers have better alternative offers. Firms set higher wages to 
attract a large “hiring pool’’ of the applicants who are heterogeneous in 
their ability to work and, in this way, they select the best workers from 
large pool. Firms have an incentive to pay higher wages if there is positive 
correlation between the average quality of the worker and wage rate. 
Simply, firms like to have a good pool of applicants for their jobs so that 
they may select among them.  If the firm does a good job at selection via 
its tests and interviews, it will be able to pick up workers of better quality 
than otherwise. This gives the firm incentive to offer higher than 
equilibrium wages.  
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 (3) The Gift Exchange Model. Partial gift exchange hypothesis by Akerlof 
(1982, 1984) is an efficiency wage theory based on sociological factors. This 
model takes into account ‘non economic variables’. Akerlof argues that people 
will work hard with higher wages when there is even no threat of dismissal 
from job.  He interprets the model as a “gift-exchange” between the firm and 
its workers. Simply, when firms pay higher wages in excess of the competitive 
wage, the workers feel obliged and reciprocate with repaying in the form of the 
gift of higher effort level. According to the basic idea of the “labour market as 
partial gift exchange”, the loyalty of workers is exchanged for high wages, and 
this loyalty results in high productivity of the firm. 
 (4) Fair Wages. This model was developed by Akerloff and Yellen (1990). 
Workers have some fair-reference wage, and firms have an incentive to 
pay wages that are closer to worker’s fair reference wage. Firms which pay 
less than the fair wage create dissatisfaction, low morale, high quit rates, 
shirking and absenteeism on the job, as therefore receive less productivity 
from their workers. Fair reference wage depends upon a number of factors 
as given below: 
 (i) Fair reference wage may correlate with firm’s profit opportunities 
and hence high profit firms are forced to pay higher wages to draw 
out the required level of effort.  
 (ii) If higher profit opportunities are associated with higher marginal 
product of effort, firms have an incentive to exploit higher profits by 
paying higher wages more than competitive wages.  
 (iii) Fair reference wage may depend upon the previous wage periods and 
wages paid to the workers across different firms with similar human 
characteristics like age, education etc. 
 (5) The Shirking Model. This version of Efficiency Wage Theory has been 
developed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Bowles (1985), Fehr (1986) and 
others. The problem confronting the employers is to minimise shirking 
because employees shirk on their jobs whenever they find opportunity. 
Monitoring is imperfect and costly for the firms so the payment of wages to 
the workers in excess of the current competitive market wage is an effective 
way to discourage shirking. At the competitive wage, workers fired for 
shirking can easily find other jobs at the going wage rate. In equilibrium, all 
workers are paid above the market-clearing wage and, as a result, the 
consequent unemployment acts as a ‘worker discipline device’. In this way, 
cost of job loss will increase the firm’s output. The firm can hire a worker at 
low wage but it knows that it is in favour of worker to shirk on the job. 
Another hypothesis associated with the Shirking Model is that firms should 
pay high wages to the workers in the occupation where poor work 
performance can cause larger damage to the firm. [Romaguera (1991)]. 
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III.  WAGE DIFFERENTIALS ACROSS INDUSTRIES 
An important piece of evidence in favour of the EWH is that there are stable 
and persistent differentials in real wages across industries. Early studies which 
established the existence of such differentials were Slitcher (1950) and Dunlop 
(1957). More sophisticated recent studies will be discussed later. If labour is 
homogenous, and job characteristics are the same, then this observation contradicts 
the neoclassical theory which maintains that there should be only one equilibrium 
wage in the labour market as a whole. This section examines the data on wage 
differentials in the context of Pakistan. 
For Pakistan, Nasir (2000) has calculated wage differentials taking into 
account personal and structural factors that determine compensation package for 
public and private sector.  He concluded that private sector pays higher wages for the 
identical characteristics. 
Based on annual industry level wage data given in government publication 50 
Years of Pakistan,  we analysed wage differential in eight industries for which a complete 
time series from 1964 to 1994 was available. These were Textile, Engineering, Minerals 
and Metals, Chemical and Dyes, Paper and Printings, Wood Stone and Glass, Skin and 
Hides and  Miscellaneous.  The data is given in the table below: 
Year All Textile Eng. 
Mineral and
Metals 
Chemical 
and Dyes 
Paper and
Printing 
Wood Stone 
and Glass 
Skin and 
Hides Misc. 
1964 1564 1387 1381 1377 1491 1999 1217 1390 1113 
1965 1452 1473 1502 1645 1280 1665 1283 1801 1529 
1966 1572 1730 1660 1583 1835 1733 1401 1818 1641 
1967 1131 1822 1582 1660 1721 1836 1547 1825 1553 
1968 1644 1897 1625 1553 1966 2166 1727 2027 1432 
1969 1887 1811 1885 1656 2033 2046 1864 1802 1998 
1970 1833 1716 1859 1711 2012 2027 1525 1934 2584 
1971 1807 1855 1594 1864 2533 1161 1882 1754 1544 
1972 1955 1969 1786 2091 2153 1994 2043 2322 2141 
1973 3036 2766 2378 3199 6578 4421 2802 2824 6773 
1974 3630 3458 3577 3138 4521 6752 3392 3749 6185 
1975 4243 4394 3911 3616 4667 5135 3967 4483 8981 
1976 4661 4325 4731 4619 5669 6122 3095 5895 9971 
1977 5860 5284 6807 4842 7217 5837 5913 6276 11185 
1978 7346 6910 7747 6183 7874 5665 7046 7075 16190 
1979 7600 6976 8185 6239 8532 6005 7647 7115 7334 
1980 7099 5420 9106 8866 8657 8893 9668 6574 1902 
1981 7527 5940 9313 8437 8273 13767 6367 6387 9899 
1982 8436 7157 10806 12363 8853 13800 6822 9281 9726 
1983 9023 7165 10787 11484 11217 12375 6799 12389 11284 
1984 8561 8193 6879 8095 14715 10471 8594 4303 9525 
1985 10579 8758 13054 13516 14319 7843 13479 10478 8602 
1986 11138 9542 12005 13491 14557 14623 13867 11501 11324 
1987 13905 10313 17889 24176 15860 20186 19568 14656 14499 
1988 13571 9930 16153 16032 17127 16592 17860 13596 14137 
1989 15477 11866 18250 20014 22547 20625 19126 12567 14100 
1990 20820 19008 22687 2969 27889 22344 20299 21749 19517 
1991 16314 14365 17330 22976 18776 16254 19967 6851 19746 
1992 24259 17042 22234 21564 51179 25719 23249 26801 48217 
1993 18019 17828 15197 21280 26837 16495 17691 21578 16961 
1994 23469 17330 26560 25037 33082 37368 28776 23187 19801 
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A graph of the differences between the sectoral wage and the overall average 
across all industries is presented below. While there is widespread fluctuation in 
these wages, there does not seem to be any overall stability or persistence in the 
differences across industries.  This is in contrast to the evidence from USA, where 
there are stable and persistent differences in wages across industries. A number of 
different methods were tried to assess the existence of a wage differential. In all 
cases, the textile industry appeared to offer significantly different wages from the 
rest, while in all other industries, there was no significant differential between the 
industry specific wage, and the overall wage in all industries. Below we indicate two 
methods, both of which led to this same conclusion. 
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Method 1.  The graph of the wages clearly shows that there is substantial and 
increasing heteroskedasticity with time. Let Wi(t) be the wage in the ith industry in 
year t, and let W(t) be the overall wage in all industries. According to conventional 
theory, any difference between the wage in the ith industry and the overall wage 
Di(t) = Wi(t)–W(t)  can only be due to chance and random fluctuations. In particular, 
there should be no relation between Di(t) and Di(t–1). Thus, in a regression of Di(t) 
on Di(t–1), the coefficient on Di(t–1) should not be significant.  In running this 
regression, it is crucial to take care of the heteroskedasticity which is evident from 
the graphs of the wage data. A number of ways of estimating the standard deviation 
and adjusting the data for heteroskedasticity were tried, all of which led to the same 
result. In all cases, the regression coefficient of Di(t–1) was not significant except for 
the textile industry. The table below presents the coefficient estimates for the eight 
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regressions of Di(t) on Di(t–1). For heteroskedasticity, we partitioned the data in 
three time periods: (i) 1964-72, (ii) 1973-86, and (iii) 1987-96.  For the three periods, 
we estimated the standard errors to be std(1)=220, std(2) = 2200, std(3) = 5500. The 
data was divided by these estimated standard errors prior to running the regressions 
reported in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 
 
Coefficients
Standard 
Error t-stat P-value
Eight 
Regressions 
Intercept –0.07 0.14 –0.55 0.59 
Textile 0.51 0.16 3.09 0.00 
Intercept 0.19 0.13 1.52 0.14 
Engineering 0.23 0.18 1.27 0.21 
Intercept 0.28 0.21 1.34 0.19 
Mineral Metals –0.07 0.19 –0.36 0.72 
Intercept 0.97 0.29 3.34 0.00 
Chemical and Dyes 0.16 0.19 0.86 0.40 
Intercept 0.44 0.26 1.69 0.10 
Paper and Printing 0.31 0.18 1.70 0.10 
Intercept 0.09 0.14 0.66 0.51 
Wood Stone and Glass 0.27 0.17 1.60 0.12 
Intercept 0.25 0.19 1.30 0.20 
Skin and Hides 0.11 0.19 0.57 0.57 
Intercept 0.77 0.32 2.41 0.02 
Misc. 0.05 0.18 0.29 0.77 
Let TW*(t) be the 
wage in Textiles 
in year t divided 
by Std. Error. We 
regress TW*(t) on 
constant and 
TW*(t–1). The 
constant is 
estimated to be     
–0.07, with t-stat   
–0.55. The 
coefficient on 
TW*(t–1) is 0.51 
with the only 
significant t-stat 
(3.01) in the table. 
 
Except in the case of Textiles, the coefficients on last periods wage differential 
are not significant, showing that fluctuations away from overall average wage do not 
persist, and are temporary only.  However, the differential between the textile wage 
and the overall industry wage is significant and also persistent across time. 
Method 2. Another way of taking care of heteroskedasticity is to look at the 
rate of change. Define di(t) = log(Wi(t)/W(t)) to be the log of the ratio of the wage 
in the ith industry to the overall industry average. If wages across industries 
conform to the competitive labour market theory, then di(t) should be a purely 
random fluctuation, unrelated to di(t–1). If there are significant differences in 
wages across industries, then the regression of di(t) on a constant and di(t–1) 
should yield a significant coefficient for di(t–1).  Running these regressions led to 
the same result as before—only the textile industry had a significant coefficient on 
lagged wage differential, while the other industries conformed to the competitive 
model.  
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Coefficients
Standard 
Error t-stat P-value
Eight  
Regressions 
Intercept –0.05 0.03 –1.58 0.13 
Textile 0.53 0.17 3.14 0.00 
Intercept 0.04 0.03 1.60 0.12 
Engineering 0.27 0.18 1.52 0.14 
Intercept 0.01 0.08 0.13 0.90 
Mineral Metals –0.15 0.19 –0.81 0.43 
Intercept 0.21 0.05 3.81 0.00 
Chemical and Dyes 0.14 0.18 0.80 0.43 
Intercept 0.11 0.05 2.11 0.04 
Paper and Printing 0.31 0.18 1.67 0.11 
Intercept 0.02 0.03 0.58 0.57 
Wood Stone and Glass 0.33 0.17 1.91 0.07 
Intercept 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.88 
Skin and Hides –0.06 0.19 –0.34 0.73 
Intercept 0.11 0.08 1.42 0.17 
Misc. 0.28 0.18 1.58 0.13 
This table gives the 
results for 
regressions of di(t) 
on di(t-1) for each of 
the eight sectors 
indicated. The first 
two lines show that  
di(t)= -0.05+0.53 
di(t-1) 
for the textile 
industry. The 
coefficient 0.53 of 
lagged di=ln(Wi/W) 
is significant only for 
the textile industry 
and not significant in 
all other industries.  
 
 
Overall, we may summarise our findings for Pakistan by concluding that the 
wage differential for the textile industry appears to be stable and persistent across 
time, contrary to the neoclassical theories of the labour market. Other industries 
appear to conform to the competitive labour market structure, with wage differing by 
random and non-persistent amounts from the overall wage average.  
Since the finding of wage differentials has been well established on US data, 
there has been substantial work on explaining why these wage differentials arise. 
Several explanations which conform to the neoclassical theory have been offered— 
these allow one to defend the neoclassical idea of efficiency of markets. Other 
explanations consistent with the efficiency wage hypothesis have also been offered. 
For a more complete discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of these alternative 
explanations for persistent and stable differentials in industry wages, [see Abbas 
(2006)]. It would be worth exploring in future research why the wages in the textile 
sector differ significantly from overall wages in over the time period examined in 
Pakistan, and also why there are no significant differences between wages in the 
other industries. 
 
V.  EFFICIENCY WAGES IN THE TEXTILE SECTOR IN PAKISTAN 
From our preliminary investigation of the wage differential, it appears that the 
textile industry offers efficiency wages, while the others are competitive. In this 
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section, we do a direct test of the efficiency wage hypothesis for the textile sector, 
replicating similar studies by Wadhwani and Wall (1991), and Levine (1992). We 
test the efficiency wage hypothesis at industry level rather than at the firm level 
because data is not available at firm level in Pakistan.  A regression of log (Q), 
output of the textile industry, on capital, labour, and the relative wage variable log 
(W/W*), W is wages and W* is the Average Wage level in textile industry yields the 
following estimates: 
Log(Q) = 3.93+0.13 Log(K)+0.60 Log(E)+0.60 Log(Wi/W)+error [R2 =0.985] 
            (1.08)(0.07)           (0.87)             (0.04)                      (0.082) 
The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors. All coeffients are 
significant at levels above 99 percent except the coefficient of Log(K) which has a p-
value of 6.9 percent.  
Data and Variables. The data used in this regression is obtained from 
various issues of Censes of Manufacturing Industries (CMI) for 19 years. The 
variables are: 
 Q: the value of production of Textile industry (Rs million) at the end of the 
year.  
 K: We use value of fixed assets (Rs million) at the end of the year.  
 E: the reported number of workers.  
 Wi: is calculated by dividing sum of total employment costs (Rs million) by 
Average number of workers employed during the year for textile industry. 
W:  is the Average Wage level in the manufacturing industry. 
We use manufacturing price index with 1980-1981 as base year to deflate.  
Discussion of Results. Our coefficients on all the variables are positive, 
significant and plausible in magnitude. The sum of the coefficients on capital and 
labour is nearly unity, so that constant returns to scale is observed. The key 
observation is that the coefficient on log (Wi/W) is positive and significant. 
According to neoclassical theory, the inputs of Capital and Labour determine the 
output, and coefficient of the wage ratio should not be significant. Indeed, the wage 
ratio Wi/W should be one in equilibrium and differences from 1 only represent 
temporary disequilibrium which should not impact on production. The significant 
positive coefficient corresponds to the prediction of efficiency wage hypothesis, 
according to which higher than equilibrium wages will result in increased output. 
Our estimated coefficient for log (Wi/W) is (.60) [t-ratio, 14.89]. In comparison, 
Levine reports (.46), Wadhwani and Wall (.39), Huang, Hallam, Orazem and Pater 
(1998) estimate ranged between (.19) to (.61) and Şeref Saygili (.15). Our high 
coefficient shows that there is a significant impact of increased wages on 
productivity.  
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Solow Condition.  Profit maximisation in an efficiency wage setting requires 
that the productivity gain from increasing wages should exactly offset the loss due to 
increased wage bill. It can be shown that this requires the coefficients of E and 
Wi/W* to be the same. This well-known result of the standard efficiency wage model 
is due to Solow (1979) and is known as the Solow condition. The efficiency wage 
theory suggests that Solow condition holds which implies that percent change in 
wage should lead to percentage change in effort level to such an extent it will be 
unity. However, if it does not hold, equilibrium is not achieved with unemployment 
in Efficiency wage models [Akerlof and Yellen (1986)].1  Imposing the Solow 
condition, the results for the constrained regression are as follows: 
        Ln (Q)=5.39+ 0.12 Log(K)+0.60 Log (E)+0.60 Log (Wi/W)+error[R2 = 0.0984] 
      (0.43) (0.07)            (0.04)              (0.04)                     (0.085) 
The F-statistic for the constraint is 1.04 with p-value 0.37, comfortably far 
from rejection. 
Thus it appears that the Solow condition holds for efficiency wages in the 
textile industry. This contrasts with findings of Saygili (1998) for the Turkish cement 
industry, where the estimated coefficient on wages is significantly smaller than the 
estimated coefficient on labour input. Similarly, Wadhwani and Wall (1991) also 
report that for selected UK manufacturing industries, the coefficient on relative wage 
(.39) is significantly less than the estimated coefficient on labour input (.65). Thus, 
while efficiency wages are present, the Solow equilibrium condition for efficiency 
wage models does not hold in the Turkish cement industry or in the UK 
manufacturing industries tested. 
Effects of Unemployment. Conventional propositions of the standard 
neoclassical theory hold that the outside changes in the cluster of unemployment do 
not affect productivity of the firm. Conversely, the efficiency wage hypothesis 
suggests that the outside rates of unemployment have an impact on productivity of 
the firms. In this context, in earlier nineties, the effect of rate of unemployment on 
firm’s productivity was analysed.  Wadhwani and Wall (1991) using OLS and GMM 
techniques test the impact of unemployment on productivity with Cobb-Douglas 
production function with the data from published accounts of 219 UK manufacturing 
companies over the period 1972-1982.  Efficiency wage hypothesis requires that the 
outside cluster of unemployment positively affects the output of the firm. Their 
findings show that the coefficient of unemployment is positively signed and 
statistically significant (.05) (2.12). On the other hand, when Huang, et al. (1998) 
add unemployment rate to the regression, the unemployment output elasticity is 
positive and ranges from (.06) to (.11) which are also consistent with efficiency wage 
hypothesis.  
 
1For details see Akerlof and Yellen (1986) who discuss that there can be situations where 
‘equilibrium effort-wage elasticity’ can be lower. 
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In contrast to these typical findings reported above, unemployment, when added 
to the equation for textile industry in Pakistan, does not have significant coefficients. 
Thus, in contrast to predictions of the efficiency wage theories, outside pool of 
unemployment does not increase productivity in the textile industry in Pakistan. This 
finding supports “Fair Wage” and “Gift Exchange” models, but not the “Shirking 
Model” since large pools of unemployment would increase losses from shirking. 
Alternatively, at sufficiently high levels of unemployment, the loss from being fired 
may be so high that no one shirks. In such cases, further increases in unemployment 
would not change productivity. More investigation is needed to discover exactly why 
unemployment fails to affect productivity in the textile sector in Pakistan. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
Our main findings are that the textile sector in Pakistan offers efficiency 
wages, which differ significantly from overall average industrial wages. Other 
industries appear to be competitive, in that their wages do not differ significantly 
from overall industrial wages. Further investigation is needed to discover factors 
which result in efficiency wages in the textile sector but not in the other sectors. A 
direct estimate of the production function shows that the ratio of wages in textile 
industry to average wage level significantly affects textile production. This is 
impossible according to neoclassical theory, since their should be no significant 
differences between wages in textile sector and overall industrial wage. Efficiency 
wage theory predicts a positive coefficient for this variable, and also suggest that the 
coefficient on relative wage should equal that of log(labour)—the Solow equilibrium 
condition. While typical estimates in literature reject the Solow condition, our 
estimates for Pakistan accept the Solow condition. We also find that the outside pool 
of unemployed labour does not affect productivity in the textile sector. Again this 
last result is in contrast with typical findings in the literature.  Thus, our investigation 
of efficiency wages in Pakistan show strong empirical support for the hypothesis, 
together with interesting local variations from results reported elsewhere. Further 
research is needed to determine the reasons for the variations.   
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Comments 
 
The paper under discussion tests the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis (EWH) for 
the textile industry of Pakistan and concludes that for the period under study there is 
empirical evidence to support the EWH. In view of strengthening the overall 
theoretical and empirical analysis presented in the paper, the following points need to 
be taken into consideration by the authors:   
 (1) It is not clearly mentioned in the paper as to what is the period under 
study. Which year’s Census of Manufacturing Industries (CMI) has or 
CMIs have been used. Table 2 gives summary statistics for the variables 
used but does not mention the source of data. What is U? (Mean U=1.03 
??) Is source of data on unemployment, the Labour Force Survey and if 
so, for which year? 
 (2) Regarding stable and persistent differentials in real wages across 
industries, the Table on Page 7 gives correlation coefficients for wages 
across industries in Pakistan. Given that the EWH is being tested 
specifically for the textile industry in Pakistan, how valid is the inference 
drawn from the correlation coefficients for the aggregate industry wage 
data. 
 (3) On Page 8, the authors claim that their research confirms the basic idea 
that workers with similar characteristics receive different wages in 
different industries. How are they controlling for similar characteristics, 
especially if this result is being inferred from the simple correlation 
coefficients in the Table on Page 7. 
 (4) How realistic is the perceived linkage from higher wages to higher 
productivity, (according to EWH), given that the thrust of current 
macroeconomic and socio-economic policy and planning framework in 
Pakistan is on promoting skill development linked with higher 
productivity leading to higher wages and lower unit costs of production! 
 (5) According to the LFS 2003-2004, the overall labour force profile of the 
Pakistani labour force reveals that only 13.73  percent of the employed 
persons 10 years and older are employed in the manufacturing industry 
(11.25 percent male + 2.49 percent female) in contrast with 43.05 percent 
employed in the agriculture sector. The authors should contextualise their 
results for the textile industry with the distribution of the employed labour 
force in Pakistan. 
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 (6) Even though the paper does not contain any policy recommendations, it is 
worth noting that it draws attention to the importance of a Wage 
Monitoring Mechanism both at the aggregate as well as at a disaggregated 
level, especially in the context of tracking the wage-productivity 
relationship. 
 (7) As part of the on-going labour policy reform, the Government intends to 
build upon the institutional arrangements under the labour policy 
framework by establishing a National Wage Commission to work on a 
range of wage-related issues, including minimum wages. The purpose, 
specific functions, and operational arrangements for the National Wage 
Commission, including its technical and secretariat support requirements, 
will be elaborated in a separate and detailed policy paper to be prepared in 
close consultation with employers’ and workers’ organisations.   
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